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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NEW FACE OF MISSOURI CHILD SEX CRIMES:
ELECT OR INSTRUCT

INTRODUCTION
“Lloyd G. Oswald was convicted of the detestable and abominable crime
against nature. He has appealed from a judgment imposing twenty years’
imprisonment in accord with the verdict.”1
These were the opening words of State v. Oswald, an early Missouri
Supreme Court decision involving multiple acts of statutory sodomy.2 Despite
recognizing the defendant’s crimes as ones so atrocious they were “not fit to be
named,” the court nonetheless concluded that the jury’s ability to convict the
defendant if they believed he committed either of two acts constituting the
offense of sodomy violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.3
Long forgotten until recently, Oswald stands in direct opposition to the last
several decades of Missouri jurisprudence governing cases involving multiple
criminal acts.
Modern child sex crimes are equally as “detestable” and “abominable” as
they were in the 1950s. As in Oswald, many involve a series of acts committed
over a lengthy time span.4 In Missouri, the trend towards alleging the
commission of multiple acts in a multi-count indictment spanning a period of
weeks, months, or even years has led to increasing judicial deference.5
Arguably, prosecutors have received the widest possible latitude in drafting
indictments and informations in these cases. Until recently, most pre-prepared
verdict directors alleging general time frames have read something to the effect
of:
As to Count _____, regarding the defendant _____, if you find and believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
That between the dates of _____ and _____, in the County of _____, State of
Missouri, the defendant [committed the crime of] _____,

1. State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Mo. 1957) (citation omitted) (“We quote §
563.230: ‘Every person who shall be convicted of the detestable and abominable crime against
nature, committed with mankind or with beast, with the sexual organs or with the mouth, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two years.’”).
2. Id. at 563.
3. Id. at 562–63.
4. See, e.g., State v. Germany, 323 S.W.3d 472, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (describing
multiple sex acts between October 2006 and April 2007).
5. See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
493
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Then you will find the defendant guilty under Count _____ of _____.

After a Missouri Supreme Court decision handed down in June 2011, however,
prosecutors may no longer rely on general allegations of time as set out in the
Missouri Approved Instructions without taking additional steps to ensure jury
unanimity as to a particular act.7
In State v. Celis-Garcia, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the use of
general verdict directors in multiple acts cases.8 Although the court’s ruling in
Celis-Garcia reaches all multiple acts cases before the courts irrespective of
subject matter, the issue frequently arises in cases involving child sex crimes.9
Consequently, this Article will focus specifically on cases involving multiple
sexual acts committed against children. It will argue that Celis-Garcia was
correctly decided and that the court’s adoption of the “either/or” rule for child
sex crimes requires a strategic response from Missouri prosecutors in several
critical respects. Before analyzing the impact of the Celis-Garcia decision, this
Article will first provide a brief overview of Celis-Garcia, and then provide a
short history of the legal doctrine and caselaw leading up to the court’s
decision.
I. FACTUAL BACKROUND
In April 2006, C.J. and K.J., two females ages five and seven, were
removed from the home of their mother, Maura Celis-Garcia, and placed in
foster care.10 Upon informing their foster mother that they had been sexually
abused by their mother and her boyfriend on several occasions, the children
were interviewed and taken to the hospital for sexual assault forensic
examinations (“SAFE”).11 Celis-Garcia was subsequently charged with two
counts of first-degree statutory sodomy—one for each daughter.12 Though
Celis-Garcia initially was tried in September 2007, the jury was unable to
reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared.13 Celis-Garcia was retried two
months later.14

6. See, e.g., State v. Rudd, 759 S.W.2d 625, 628–29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding like
instructions as “rescripts of MAI-Cr.3d 320.02.2, adapted to the facts of the case”) (“The words
‘on or about’ do not put the time at large, but indicate that it is stated with approximate
certainty.”).
7. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
8. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 158 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
9. See id. at 155–56 (defining a multiple acts case).
10. Id. at 152.
11. Id. (“The SAFE reports indicated that C.J. had a segment of her hymen missing, while
K.J.’s genitals showed no abnormalities.”).
12. Id.
13. Celis-Garica, 344 S.W.3d at 152.
14. Id.
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During the second trial, the State presented videotaped depositions of each
child describing the separate incidents of statutory sodomy.15 K.J.’s deposition
detailed two occurrences of sodomy on an enclosed back porch and one in her
mother’s bedroom.16 As to the first incident, K.J. testified that Celis-Garcia and
her boyfriend touched her breasts, vagina, and buttocks with their hands.17 She
described the second incident as occurring several days later and claimed
Celis-Garcia and her boyfriend handcuffed her hands and feet, hung her naked
from a hook on the bedroom wall, and touched her genitals with their hands.18
With regard to the third incident, K.J. alleged Celis-Garcia and her boyfriend
removed both girls from the shower, led them to the enclosed back porch, and
touched both girls’ private areas with their hands.19 C.J. testified separately to
the same incident of sexual assault in the bedroom, and a second occurrence of
sexual touching in a shed behind the home.20 C.J. also claimed to have
witnessed multiple incidents of sexual abuse committed on her sister.21
The prosecution presented testimony from two individuals with whom the
girls had spoken, a forensic interviewer with a children’s advocacy center and
a licensed social worker. Both accounts revealed additional disclosure from the
girls involving an incident of sexual touching in the bathroom.22 At the close of
the evidence, the trial court submitted the following instruction:
As to Count 1 regarding the defendant Maura L. Celis-Garcia, if you find and
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that between the dates of January 01, 2005 and March 31, 2006, in the
County of Saline, State of Missouri, the defendant or [her boyfriend] placed
her or his hands on [C.J.’s] genitals, and
Second, that such conduct constituted deviate sexual intercourse, and
Third, that at the time [C.J.] was less than twelve years old, then you are
instructed that the offense of statutory sodomy in the first degree has
23

occurred . . . .

The jury found Celis-Garcia guilty of both counts of first-degree statutory
sodomy, and the trial court sentenced her to two twenty-five year sentences to
run concurrently with one another.24

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
Celis-Garica, 344 S.W.3d at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 154.
Id.
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Celis-Garcia contended on appeal that the trial court erred in submitting
verdict directors that failed to “include detailed information about the alleged
acts of sodomy,” thereby violating “her right to a fair trial, unanimous jury
verdict, and freedom from double jeopardy.”25 In reviewing for plain error, the
appellate court concluded the trial judge “might have had an obligation to
provide more specific instructions if requested by Ms. Celis-Garcia,” but “the
failure to do so on its own motion under these circumstances was not evident,
obvious, and clear error.”26 The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer.27
II. MUTUAL AGREEMENT: THE MISSOURI UNANIMITY REQUIREMENT
The Sixth Amendment entitles all criminal defendants to a “speedy and
public trial” by an “impartial jury.”28 In Johnson v. Louisiana, the United
States Supreme Court held that a guilty verdict from a less-than-unanimous
jury in federal court does not violate a defendant’s due process rights.29 The
Missouri Constitution also provides for a jury trial in all criminal litigation30
but further requires that the verdict be unanimous.31 In State v. Oswald, the
Missouri Supreme Court reiterated that a defendant is “entitled to the
concurrence of twelve jurors upon one definite charge of a crime.”32 Finding
that the statutory sodomy charge given by the trial judge potentially enabled
some jurors to agree the defendant was guilty of “an offense committed with
the mouth” while other jurors could reach the same result “with respect to an
offense committed with the rectum,” the court overturned the defendant’s

25. State v. Celis-Garcia, No. WD 69199, 2010 WL 1539849, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. April 20,
2010).
26. Id. at *6. The court also stated the following: “Ms. Celis-Garcia concedes that her claim
of instructional error is not preserved for appellate review because her counsel failed to object to
the verdict directors at trial. Thus, she seeks review under Rule 30.20 for ‘plain errors affecting
substantial rights.’” Id. at *2.
27. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 154; see also Mo. Const. art. V, § 10 (providing for the
transfer of cases pending in courts of appeals to the supreme court).
28. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
29. 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972); see also Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (“We
are quite sure . . . that the Sixth Amendment itself has never been held to require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal cases. The reasonable doubt standard developed separately from
both the jury trial and the unanimous verdict.”).
30. Mo. Const. art. 1, § 22(a) (“the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate . . . .”). The Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “as heretofore enjoyed”
as protecting “all the substantial incidents and consequences that pertain to the right to jury trial at
common law.” State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). The right to a
unanimous jury verdict is one of the “substantial incidents” protected by Article I, § 22(a). Id.
31. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.01(a); see also State v. McGee, 447 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Mo. 1969)
(en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“We agree that complete waiver of a jury and
consent to be tried by less than twelve jurors in substance amount to the same thing.”).
32. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d at 563.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

THE NEW FACE OF MISSOURI CHILD SEX CRIMES

497

conviction and ordered a new trial.33 Although later courts cited Oswald as
declaring erroneous disjunctive verdict directors,34 Oswald’s wider
significance with regard to jury unanimity remained largely unexplored.35
A.

Dormancy of Unanimity Challenges and Minority as a Defense to Specific
Verdict Directors

Leading up to Celis-Garcia, defendants in Missouri child sex abuse trials
significantly failed to challenge before appeal the specificity of the verdict
directors submitted by the prosecution and authorized by the trial judge.36
Presumably, this is because courts have long upheld indictments and
informations containing general allegations of time, such as “between the dates
of March 15, 1976 and November 16, 1976.”37 In these scenarios, appellate
courts have commonly cited section 545.030 of the Missouri Revised Statutes
as explicitly authorizing trial judges to approve general verdict directors.38 The
current statute provides: “No indictment or information shall be deemed
invalid . . . [f]or omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed,
in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense . . . .”39 In child
sexual abuse cases, courts have determined time is not “of the essence” due to
the lengthy (or, for violent crimes, nonexistent) statute of limitations.40 In
Missouri, the statute of limitations for prosecuting “unlawful sexual offenses”
involving minors is “thirty years after the victim reaches the age of eighteen,”

33. Id.
34. See, e.g., State v. Brigham, 709 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (“The disjunctive
submission of two distinct acts by which an offense could have been committed has been held to
be erroneous.”).
35. One of the first Missouri cases to explicitly apply Oswald’s unanimity reasoning to a
case involving multiple acts was State v. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d 543, 553–554 (Mo. Ct. App.
2011). Interestingly, Oswald cited State v. Jackson, 146 S.W. 1166 (Mo. 1912) and State v.
Washington, 146 S.W. 1164 (Mo. 1912) to support its interpretation of the unanimity
requirement—two cases later cited by Celis-Garcia in support of the same assertion. Id. at 551.
36. See, e.g., State v. Germany, 323 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“As Germany
concedes, his general objection to the instructions was insufficient to preserve for appeal his
objection to the disjunctive verdict director.”).
37. State v. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d 536, 539–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing State v. Murray,
609 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
38. See, e.g., Hoban, 738 S.W.2d at 539 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.030.1(5) (1986))
(“Section 545.030, RSMo 1986, expressly provides that an indictment shall not be deemed
invalid ‘[f]or omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed, in any case where
time is not of the essence of the offense.’”).
39. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.030.1(5) (2011) (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 929 S.W.2d 909, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that time
was not of the essence in a sodomy case); State v. Mills, 872 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (stating that time is not of the essence in sex offense cases generally).
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but prosecutions for forcible rape and forcible sodomy may be “commenced at
any time.”41
Courts over the last several decades have also based their decisions to
uphold general verdict directors on the tender age of child victims, explicitly
recognizing attacks on specificity as commonly raised on appeal, but deeming
them legally insufficient for reversal.42 Instead, general temporal allegations
have been “consistently approved” on the basis that child victims “may find it
difficult to recall precisely the dates of offenses against them months or even
years after the offense has occurred.”43 As a general policy, courts have strictly
adhered to the idea that “[l]eeway is necessary in charging sexual abuse and
sexual intercourse with minors” to prevent defendants from asserting an alibi
to avoid prosecution “once it becomes apparent that a child was confused with
respect to the date of a sexual assault.”44 In such cases, courts have concluded
“[t]he defendant is adequately protected by the requirement that the trier of fact
must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”45
Reflecting these principles, the Missouri Approved Instructions explicitly
authorize the State to set out a “less definite time period” in multiple acts
cases.46 As an example, Note on Use 5 cites State v. Siems,47 emphasizing as
correct the appellate court’s decision to uphold an instruction setting out a one
month time frame.48 Interestingly, the Notes on Use also specify that “upon
request of the defendant or on the court’s own motion, the place [of offense]
should be more definitely identified, such as ‘the front bedroom on the second
floor,’ ‘the southeast corner of the basement,’ etc.”49 While on its face this
provision may seem to protect the defendant facing a multi-count indictment, it
deals only with location rather than time, and is therefore relevant only “under
certain circumstances, such as (a) when evidence of alibi is introduced, or (b)
when an issue of venue arises, or (c) where the defendant may have committed
several separate offenses against the same victim at the same general location

41. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 556.037; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. 556.036.1 (“A prosecution for . . .
forcible rape, attempted forcible rape, forcible sodomy, attempted forcible sodomy . . . may be
commenced at any time.”).
42. See, e.g., State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he claim that
an indictment is not specific enough because the dates are too broad is often made in sexual abuse
cases.”); State v. Weiler, 801 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (“Defendant’s complaint
against the information often appears in appeals by defendants in cases of sex offenses against
children, and arguments like defendant’s have been ruled against them time after time.”).
43. State v. Carney, 195 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
44. Hoban, 783 S.W.2d at 541 (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. MAI-CR3d 304.02(5)(c) (2009).
47. 535 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
48. MAI-CR3d 304.02(5)(c) (2009).
49. MAI-CR3d 304.02(6) (2009).
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within a short space of time.”50 As Celis-Garcia later observed, the provision
standing alone is “insufficient to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a
unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts case.”51
B.

A Split Judicial Climate and the Reawakening of Oswald

By the close of the twentieth century, many appellate decisions
aggressively rejected specificity challenges based on either the jury’s capacity
to differentiate between offenses in multiple acts cases, or on an overarching
finding of culpability. Courts adopting an expansive view of overall guilt
advocated that “the jury need only be unanimous as to the ultimate issue of
guilt or innocence, and need not be unanimous as to the means by which the
crime was committed.”52 Convictions were upheld by the court so long as the
instructions submitted to the jury were clearly drafted, and each instruction
properly defined the essential elements of the defendant’s crime(s).53 In
contrast, for appellate decisions focusing on the jury’s capacity to differentiate
between counts, “the relevant inquiry [became] whether . . . the jury clearly
understood that the defendant was charged with different offenses in distinct
counts and that each offense was to be considered separately.”54 In making this
determination, courts considered whether the jury received separate and
specific verdict directors for each count charged, whether the jury heard
evidence supporting each count through the trial, and whether a split verdict
was returned by the jury after deliberation as an indication of individual
consideration of each count.55
Around the same time, some courts also began to take notice of the
potential instructional error created by the issuance of general verdict directors.
In State v. Parsons, an important case in the line of decisions ultimately giving
rise to Celis-Garcia, the defendant “concede[d] that Note 4 of the Notes on
Use for MAI-CR 3d 304.07 gives as an example the very language” he
contested on appeal, but argued that where “substantive law conflicts with

50. State v. Johnson, 62 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added).
51. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158.
52. Germany, 323 S.W.3d at 478 (quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 193 S.W.3d 280, 292 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2006)) (finding sufficient the “overwhelming” evidence that defendant had sexual
contact with one or more of his students).
53. See Carney, 195 S.W.3d at 570–71 (finding victim’s testimony as to specific acts
provided “sufficient evidence” of guilt); Sexton, 929 S.W.2d at 916–17 (finding record was
“replete with evidence” to support counts).
54. State v. Williams, 329 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
55. Id.; see also State v. Marley, 257 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The jury
acquitted Marley of all other charges involving genital and body part contact . . . . Given the
context of the instructions and the explanation in argument, we are not persuaded that the jury
was granted a roving commission that resulted in manifest injustice.”).
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MAI-CR 3d and its Notes on Use, the substantive law controls . . . .”56
Rejecting this argument, the court found that “[i]mplicit in the use of approved
pattern instructions like MAI-CR is the notion that they should be simple,
brief, and submit ultimate issues rather than detailed evidentiary facts.”57
Nonetheless, the court proceeded to analyze Parsons’ unanimity challenge
under past precedent.
Significantly, the court returned to the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision
in State v. Oswald in reviewing the defendant’s challenge to the trial court
instructions for plain error.58 Reaffirming as erroneous the use of disjunctive
verdict directors,59 the court noted that prior courts had distinguished the facts
before them from Oswald by creating the caveat that “while it [is] error to
make a disjunctive submission on the ‘gravamen of the offense’ . . . it [is] not
error to submit alternative means of the committing the offense [sic] . . . .”60
When applying this precedent to Parsons’ case, however, the court determined
that Parsons had attempted to rape the victim on “at least two separate
occasions—once in the bedroom and once in the bathroom.”61 These attempts,
the court concluded, were “not simply a continuous series of steps toward
committing a single rape” but were rather “repeated anew.”62 Based on this
analysis, the court found “the trial court erred by submitting Instruction No. 9
because it failed to identify which of these separate incidents the jury was
being asked to unanimously find constituted ‘tr[ying] to have sexual
intercourse with [Victim].’”63
Despite this finding of error, the court observed that Parsons failed to cite a
Missouri case addressing the unanimity issue and instead analogized
distinguishable cases involving disjunctive submissions.64 For this reason, the
court concluded there had been no “evident, obvious and clear” error resulting
in “manifest injustice” or “miscarriage of justice.”65 Although the court in
Parsons declined to create new precedent and failed to find that the submission
of a general verdict director in a multiple acts case constitutes plain error, the
court’s decision is nonetheless significant because it acknowledged the flawed
nature of the verdict director itself. This decision ultimately laid the

56. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d 543 at 550 (citations and quotations omitted).
57. Id. (quoting State v. Wood, 668 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)).
58. Id. at 551. In addition to relying on Oswald, the defendant had also cited State v.
Washington, 141 S.W. 1164 (Mo. 1912) and State v. Jackson, 146 S.W. 1166 (Mo. 1912), both of
which were relied on by the Missouri Supreme Court in Celis-Garcia. Id.
59. Id.
60. Parsons, 339 S.W3d at 551–52.
61. Id. at 552.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 553.
64. Id.
65. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d at 553.
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groundwork for the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision two months later in
Celis-Garcia.66
III. UNANIMTIY REDEFINED: THE CELIS-GARCIA DECISION
In State v. Celis-Garcia, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict must be protected in multiple acts
cases by the state either: (1) “electing the particular criminal act on which it
will rely to support the charge,” or (2) “specifically describing the separate
criminal acts” in the verdict director and instructing the jury “that it must agree
unanimously that at least one of those acts occurred.”67 The court began its
analysis by reaffirming a defendant’s right under the Missouri Constitution to a
unanimous jury verdict.68 In considering whether Celis-Garcia had been
deprived of this right, the court first sought to determine whether the facts
under review properly constituted a case involving “multiple acts.”69 The court
defined multiple acts as arising “when there is evidence of multiple, distinct
criminal acts,” and set out the following four-part factors analysis to guide
judicial inquiry:
(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur
at the same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the
acts, in particular whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether
70
there is a fresh impulse motivating some of the conduct.

Applying this test to the facts before them, the court observed “there were
at least seven acts of statutory sodomy that occurred at different times (some
more than three days apart) and in different locations.”71 The trial testimony
consisted of numerous incidents occurring in multiple locations including an
enclosed back porch, the defendant’s bedroom, the children’s bathroom, and a
shed behind the home.72 “Despite evidence of multiple, separate incidents of
statutory sodomy,” the court observed that “the verdict directors failed to
differentiate between the various acts in a way that ensured the jury
unanimously convicted Ms. Celis-Garcia of the same act or acts.”73
In analyzing the verdict director administered by the trial judge, the court
made several observations. First, the broad allegation of time enabled “each
individual juror to determine which incident he or she would consider in

66. Parsons was decided on April 11, 2011. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d at 543. Celis-Garcia was
decided on June 14, 2011. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 150.
67. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 157.
68. Id. at 155.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 155–156 (quoting 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007).
71. Id. at 156.
72. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 156.
73. Id.
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finding Ms. Celis-Garcia guilty of statutory sodomy.”74 As phrased, “jurors
could convict Ms. Celis-Garcia if they found that she engaged or assisted in
hand-to-genital contact with the children during an incident in her bedroom, or
on the enclosed porch, or in the shed, or in the bathroom.”75 Second, “the
verdict directors submitted by the state instructed the jurors to find Ms. CelisGarcia guilty if they believed she committed sodomy by hand-to-genital
contact generally.”76 Because “[t]he state presented evidence of multiple,
separate instances of hand-to-genital contact committed against both victims,
any one of which would have supported the charged offenses . . . the verdict
directors were erroneous.”77 In light of these observations, the court found it
was “impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously agreed on any one
of these separate incidents,” and “the verdict directors violated Ms. CelisGarcia’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict.”78
Having found the verdict director constitutionally inadequate, the court
turned next to the constitutionality of the Missouri Approved Instructions
generally, which “do not require differentiation among multiple, separate
criminal acts that each could constitute the charged offense, unless the
defendant requests or the court elects to do so on its own motion.”79 The court
found this permitted modification was “insufficient to protect a defendant’s
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts case” because
it is “written in permissive rather than mandatory language.”80 Furthermore,
the Note on Use provides for additional identifying detail only with regard to
location, failing to consider timing, or “other distinguishing characteristics.”81
“Most significantly,” the court observed, “the note does not require that the
jury unanimously agree on the same criminal act that serves as the basis for the
defendant’s conviction.”82 Given these observations, the court concluded the
constitutional mandate will only be met if a verdict director “describe[s] the
separate criminal acts with specificity,” and the court “instruct[s] the jury to

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 158.
77. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 157-158 (citing MAI-CR 3d 304.02 Note on Use 6) (“The place of the offense may
become of decisive importance under certain circumstances such as . . . (c) where the defendant
may have committed several separate offenses against the victim at the same general location
within a short space of time. In such a situation, upon the request of the defendant or on the
court’s own motion, the place should be more definitely identified, such as ‘the front bedroom on
the second floor,’ ‘the southeast corner of the basement,’ etc.”).
80. Id. at 158.
81. Id.
82. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158.
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agree unanimously on at least one of the specific criminal acts
described . . . .”83
The court also returned to its prior opinions in State v. Washington84 and
State v. Jackson,85 two companion cases unrelated to sexual offenses upon
which it had relied in Oswald to conclude the defendant’s right to a unanimous
jury verdict had been violated. The court observed both cases involved single
counts of charged criminal gambling activity, but each verdict director failed to
specify which gambling table served as the basis for prosecution.86 This
enabled the jury “to convict the defendant even though some of the jurors may
have agreed to a verdict of guilty as to one table and disbelieved the testimony
as to the other table, while the other jurors may have found the opposite to be
true.”87 The court also reiterated its prior statement in Jackson that to “avoid
violating a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts
case, the state should be required to ‘elect’ the specific act on which it asks the
jury to convict.”88 In recognizing this principal as valid, the court noted “other
states have guaranteed a unanimous verdict by allowing the prosecution either
to elect the particular criminal act on which it will rely to support the charge or
to require the trial court to specifically instruct the jury that it must agree on
the same underlying criminal act.”89 Based on this analysis, the court
concluded a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict is protected only
through election of a particular criminal act, or submission of a specific
unanimity instruction to the jury.90
“Having determined the trial court erred by failing to correctly instruct the
jury,” the court sought to determine “whether that error resulted in manifest
injustice or a miscarriage of justice, thereby warranting reversal.”91 The court
noted that the defendant “relied on evidentiary inconsistencies and factual
improbabilities respecting each specific allegation of hand-to-genital contact”
and distinguished Celis-Garcia’s case from “some statutory sodomy cases in
which the defense simply argues that the victims fabricated their stories.”92
Based on these observations, the court found it “more likely that individual
jurors convicted her on the basis of different acts,” and “the verdict directors
misdirected the jury in a way that affected the verdict, thereby resulting in

83. Id.
84. 146 S.W. 1164 (Mo. 1912).
85. 146 S.W. 1166 (Mo. 1912).
86. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W. 3d at 156.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 157 (citing Jackson, 146 S.W. at 1168).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 158.
91. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158.
92. Id. at 158–59 (also acknowledging that “the jury was free to believe or disbelieve any of
the witness testimony”).
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manifest injustice.”93 Consequently, the court reversed Ms. Celis-Garcia’s
convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy.”94
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: EVIDENT AND NOT-SO-OBVIOUS ERROR
Quite significantly, Celis-Garcia created groundbreaking constitutional
precedent in the face of “plain error” review. “Whether briefed or not, plain
errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the
court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted therefrom.”95 Plain error review under Rule 30.20 is therefore a twostep process in which the court first seeks to determine whether an obvious,
clear error occurred, and then seeks to determine if a miscarriage of justice will
result if the error is left uncorrected.96 In criminal jury trials, “reversal is proper
only if an evidentiary error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of
a fair trial.”97 Missouri courts have made clear that a mistrial is a “drastic
remedy” to be resorted to “only in the most extraordinary of circumstances”
and when “the prejudicial effect of improper evidence or argument can be
removed in no other way.”98
In State v. Germany, a case decided eight months prior to Celis-Garcia, the
Missouri Court of Appeals concluded the trial court’s submission of jury
instructions with disjunctive verdict directors alleged in multiple counts did not
constitute plain error in light of the defendant’s “overwhelming” guilt.99
“Because his guilt was clear,” the court observed, “the effect of the disjunctive
verdict director on the jury’s verdict, if any, did not result in manifest
injustice.”100 The court concluded, “a jury need only be unanimous as to the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, and need not be unanimous as to the
means by which the crime was committed.”101 Less than a year later, the
Missouri Supreme Court made a drastic turnaround.
In Celis-Garcia, the court applied “clear error” analysis to conclude a
miscarriage of justice had in fact occurred, and the defendant had been
deprived of her right to a fair trial. This legal conclusion necessitates
consideration as to why, if the error was so “clear” and “obvious,” appellate
courts failed to discern the constitutional inadequacy of the Missouri Approved
93. Id. at 159.
94. Id.
95. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.20.
96. 22 Mo. Prac., Missouri Evidence § 103.3 (3d ed. 2011).
97. Id.
98. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding plain error is that which seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings).
99. 323 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
100. Id. (citing State v. Haynes, 158 S.W.3d 918, 919–20 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005))
101. Id. at 478. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Instruction for numerous decades. This author believes Celis-Garcia was
correctly decided by the Missouri Supreme Court, and multi-count indictments
alleging general time frames were not subject to judicial scrutiny for several
reasons. First, as one appellate court observed in the 1990s, the Oswald case
was decided in 1957,102 and the Missouri Supreme Court did not approve the
first MAI criminal jury instructions until 1973.103 Presumably, Missouri courts
of appeals declined to invalidate general verdict directors under the assumption
that the Missouri Supreme Court itself would amend any approved instructions
that failed to adequately protect a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury
verdict. In the limited circumstances under which error was found by the court,
such error was therefore determined not to be a miscarriage of justice
warranting reversal. In addition, appellate courts seemingly forged an artificial
distinction between the effect of duplicitous and multiplicitous indictments,
further limiting Oswald’s ruling in an attempt to protect child victims. For
these reasons, courts did not require additional measures to protect a
defendant’s unanimity and due process rights in multiple acts cases.
A.

Duplicity Distinguished

As previously described in Celis-Garcia, multiple acts cases arise when
there is evidence of “multiple, distinct criminal acts.”104 Multiple acts cases
commonly involve acts remote in time and location that are motivated by fresh
impulse.105 When a multiple acts case exists, there are several steps a
prosecutor must take in protecting against or responding to a unanimity
challenge. First, the statutory language must be examined “to determine
whether the legislature created multiple, separate offenses, or a single offense
with alternative manners or means of commission.”106 Because sexual crimes
like statutory sodomy may be found by a jury to have been committed by any
102. It warrants remembering that when Oswald was decided, the word “sodomy” alone was
“sufficient to constitute a general verdict of guilty in prosecutions under § 563.230,” without
differentiation as to the means by which the crime was committed. See Oswald, 306 S.W.2d at
563.
103. State v. Wilkins, 872 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). But cf. State v. Pope, 733
S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App 1987) (holding pattern instruction for deviate sexual intercourse
that failed to specify deviate act with which defendant was charged allowed jurors to convict
based on testimony as to other uncharged acts, entitling defendant to a new trial) (“Modifications
of approved instructions are often called for by the facts of the case, Rule 28.02(d), and their use
is always subject to their being ‘applicable under the law to the facts’, Rule 28.02(c). The obvious
truth is stated in ‘How to Use This Book’ (1988 revision), MAI-CR2d at xviii: “Most of the
instructions were prepared upon various assumptions. If any one or more of those assumptions is
not valid for a particular case the MAI-CR instruction may need adaption to the situation
presented.”)
104. 344 S.W.3d at 155–56 (quoting 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007)).
105. 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007).
106. Id.
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one of several defined criminal actions by the defendant, they constitute
“single offense[s] with alternative manners or means of commission.”107
Verdict directors presenting such alternative means of commission in the
disjunctive create the problem of “duplicity,” defined as “the joining in a single
count of two or more distinct and separate offenses.”108
“One vice of duplicity is that a general guilty verdict against a defendant
on that count does not reveal whether the jury found him guilty of one crime
or . . . of [all potential crimes covered by the count].”109 “Conceivably, this
could prejudice the defendant in protecting himself against double jeopardy[,]”
because “numerous acts of criminal conduct falling within a duplicitous count,
together with generalized allegations of proof may” fail to “prevent a second
prosecution from being brought against a defendant.”110
“Another vice of duplicity is that because the jury has multiple offenses to
consider under a single count, the jury may convict without reaching a
unanimous agreement on the same act, thereby implicating a defendant’s right
to jury unanimity.”111 This was the Missouri Supreme Court’s rationale in
State v. Oswald. Because Oswald involved two offenses, either of which could
have constituted the single count of statutory sodomy charged in the
indictment, later courts mistakenly limited Oswald’s unanimity holding as
specific to disjunctive, either-or verdict directors.112 A proper reading of
Oswald, however, reveals that the critical issue in all cases is whether there
was “a concurrence of twelve jurors upon one definite charge of a crime,”
regardless of whether the defendant’s criminal acts are splintered into separate
counts or subsumed within a single count charged in the indictment.113
Confusingly, many child sexual abuse cases involve multiple counts of
statutory sodomy, and statutory sodomy is a crime capable of commission by
alternative means.114 Therefore, it is critical that the State determine in
advance of trial whether multiple offenses will be contemplated within a single
count or within multiple counts. As modern scholars recognize:

107. Id.; see also Oswald, 306 S.W.2d at 563 (finding the charged count of statutory sodomy
could have been found by the jury to have been committed by means of the mouth or the rectum).
108. Thomas Lundy, Jury Instruction Corner: Duplicity—Part Two: A Methodology for
Determining When Specific Juror Unanimity Is Required, 34 Champion, Dec. 2010, at 49, 49
(emphasis added).
109. State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 515 (S.D. 2009) (quoting United States v. Starks, 515
F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1975)).
110. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 517 (citing United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2005)).
112. See, e.g., State v.Brigham, 709 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
113. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., State v. Hyman, 37 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Wyatt, 811
S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App.1991).
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The unanimity of a verdict is jeopardized in multiple-count trials if more
incidents of the offenses are presented than the number charged, and the jury
receives no guidance from the trial court or indication from the State as to
which offenses are to be considered for which verdict sheets. Also, charging in
the disjunctive on separate offenses involving separate incidents runs afoul of
115
the unanimity requirement for a jury verdict . . . .

Therefore, when only a single count is charged, Oswald makes clear that the
State may not submit a disjunctive verdict director.116 When multiple acts are
presented to the jury in conjunction with a verdict director alleging multiple
counts, specific election or instruction is required.
Unlike Oswald, cases like Celis-Garcia and its predecessors involving
multi-count indictments charged within a general time frame create the danger
of “multiplicity,” defined as the splintering of a single offense into separate
counts of an indictment.”117 Therefore, “in . . .cases involving multiple acts,
either an instruction must be given stating that the jurors must unanimously
find the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, or the state must make an election as to the particular act upon which it
will rely for conviction.”118 Defendants view the election requirement
favorably because it enables focused defense preparation, protects the
defendant against double jeopardy, and facilitates appellate review of the legal
sufficiency of the evidence presented.119 In many states, a defendant’s failure
to request an election by the prosecution necessitates a unanimity instruction
given by the trial judge to the jury.120
Missouri cases were slow to recognize the danger of multiplicity due to the
artificial distinction forged by appellate courts between the effect of
duplicitous and multiplicitous indictments. The appellate court in Celis-Garcia
distinguished their decision from Oswald by reasoning that the specific act of
sodomy was not presented in the disjunctive, and therefore Ms. Celis-Garcia
“could not have been found guilty of first-degree statutory sodomy unless all
of the jurors agreed” she was guilty of the count charged.121 In creating this
distinction, the court limited Oswald’s unanimity requirement to protect only
against the threat of duplicity. Although the indictment in Oswald was
duplicitous rather than multiplicitous, Oswald ultimately stood for the
proposition that each member of the jury must agree to the same set of facts
constituting the crime charged in rendering a guilty verdict.122 Despite Celis115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007).
State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Mo. 1957).
State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 514 (S.D. 2009).
23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1647 (2011).
Id.
Id.
State v. Celis-Garcia, No. WD 69199, 2010 WL 1539849, at *4 (April 20, 2010).
See State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Mo. 1957).
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Garcia’s contention that the verdict directors lacked specificity as to the date
and location of the offenses charged, the court turned a blind eye to
multiplicity dangers in narrowly interpreting the MAI.
In determining that time is not of the essence in child sex crimes,123 courts
seemingly lost sight of the requirement that the particular acts alleged in an
indictment must nonetheless be distinguished from one another and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. To rectify this error, the Missouri Supreme Court
in Celis-Garcia drew from a developing body of caselaw in other states
regarding a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict in multiple acts
cases.124
B.

Elect or Instruct: Evolving National Precedent

As explained by the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Muhm, the
most commonly followed procedure for balancing the need to prosecute cases
involving repetitive acts charged in a single count against a defendant’s due
process and jury unanimity rights has been described as the “either/or rule.”125
This rule is derived predominantly from California caselaw. In People v.
Jones, the California Supreme Court observed that several decisions of its
lower court had developed an either/or rule applicable when the number of
specific acts introduced at trial exceeded the number of acts pleaded in the
information: “Either the prosecutor must select the acts relied on to prove the
charges, or the jury must be given an instruction that it must unanimously
agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the same
specific criminal act.”126 Interestingly, the South Dakota Supreme Court
additionally concluded that:
when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular
acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed
all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which,
in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific
acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant
127
committed all the acts described by the victim.

The court reasoned that because credibility is usually the “true issue,” the jury
will either “believe the child’s testimony that the consistent, repetitive pattern
of acts occurred or disbelieve it.”128

123. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
124. See State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
125. 775 N.W.2d 508, 518 (S.D. 2009).
126. 792 P.2d 643, 649 (Cal. 1990) (en banc).
127. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d at 519 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 520 (quoting Jones, 792 P.2d at 659) (“In either event, a defendant will have his
unanimous jury verdict and the prosecution will have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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In an opinion somewhat in conflict with Missouri caselaw, the Supreme
Court of Ohio recognized that while the prosecution must either “elect” or
“instruct” in multiple acts cases, the same is not applicable to alternative means
cases:
In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more
than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime
charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the
crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative
means. In reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the
129
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Several states have adopted verdict directors for use in both single and
multi-count, multiple acts cases. The pattern Kansas instruction for single
count, multiple act cases specifies that for the defendant to be found guilty of
the crime charged, the jury “must unanimously agree on the same underlying
act.”130 In multiple count cases, the jury is instructed that “each crime
charged . . . is a separate and distinct offense,” and each charge must be
decided separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by
the jury’s decision as to any other charge.131
The state of California, on the other hand, adopted a multiple acts
instruction specific to child sexual abuse cases.132 The verdict director specifies
the counts in which the defendant is accused of having committed the
particular crime, and also the general time frame in which the acts were alleged
to have occurred. In its entirety, the verdict director reads:
Defendant is accused [in Count[s]______] of having committed the crime of
______, a violation of section ______ of the Penal Code, on or about a period
of time between ______ and ______.
In order to find the defendant guilty, it is necessary for the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of [a specific act [or acts]
constituting that crime] [all of the acts described by the alleged victim] within
the period alleged.

defendant committed a specific act, for if the jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it
necessarily believes he committed each specific act.”).
129. State v. Gardner, 889 N.E.2d 995, 1005 (Ohio 2008); c.f. State v.Oswald, 306 S.W.2d
559, 563 (Mo. 1957) (“It cannot be determined that there was a concurrence of twelve jurors upon
one definite charge of a crime.”).
130. PIK-CR3d. 68.09-B (2009).
131. PIK-CR3d. 68.07 (2009).
132. See CALJIC 17.01 (2011) (“In child molesting cases, when it is alleged defendant
committed two or more crimes between certain dates, use CALJIC 4.71.5.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

510

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:493

And, in order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously agree upon
the commission of [the same specific act [or acts] constituting the crime] [all
of the acts described by the alleged victim] within the period alleged.
It is not necessary that the particular act or acts committed so agreed upon be
133
stated in the verdict.

The Use Note specifies this instruction is to be used “where the information
charges an act or series of acts within a specified period and the prosecution
has not elected to rely upon any specific date or dates, and the alleged criminal
activity does not come within the continuous course of conduct exception.”134
Washington adopted a specific election instruction to be used “for a case in
which the jury heard evidence of multiple acts but the prosecutor has elected to
specify one act as constituting the criminal conduct.”135 This instruction
informs the jury that the State, in alleging a particular crime, has relied upon
evidence regarding a single act constituting the offense which must be proved
and agreed to by the jury unanimously.136 When no such election is made, the
prosecution is instructed to use WPIC 4.25, which informs the jury they must
unanimously agree to one of multiple acts constituting the offense.137
C. Missouri and Prosecutorial “Elect or Instruct” Strategy
The “elect or instruct rule” is undoubtedly the new face of child sex crimes
for Missouri prosecutors. In 2010 alone, 270 of the 292 victims of registered
Missouri sex offenders were under the age of eighteen.138 Of those child
victims, forty were male and 230 were female.139 National statistics show that
sixty-seven percent of sexual assaults involve victims under eighteen, and
approximately two-thirds of these sexual assaults are committed by someone
known to the victim.140 Based on the overwhelming number of child victims
and the common familiarity these victims share with their perpetrators,
prosecutors will be continually forced to rely on multi-count indictments
alleged over a general time frame.
Nonetheless, no new instruction has been adopted by the Missouri
Supreme Court since Celis-Garcia was decided. Presumably, trial judges have
133. CALJIC 4.71.5 (2011).
134. Id.
135. 11 WPIC 4.26 (3d ed. 2008).
136. Id.
137. 11 WPIC 4.25 (3d ed. 2008).
138. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, Missouri Sex Offender Registry: Summary of
Victim
Demographics
Gender
by
Age
Group,
Offense
Year
2010,
http://www.mshp.dps.mo.gov/CJ38/statistics.jsp (last visited May 20, 2012).
139. Id.
140. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, Sex Offender Registry Fact Sheet,
http://www.mshp.dps.mo.gov/MSHPWeb/PatrolDivisions/CRID/SOR/factsheet.html (last visited
May 20, 2012) (citing U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics 2007).
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proceeded by issuing a unanimity instruction in conjunction with the verdict
directors when the prosecution fails to elect a specific transaction or
occurrence to constitute each offense charged in a criminal indictment. As
suggested by the Missouri Practice Handbook, motions for bills of particulars
may also be appropriate in some cases.141 Citing to Celis-Garcia, the Criminal
Practice Handbook suggests that “some judges will insist that a bill of
particulars be filed which fixes the time of the occurrence or occurrences with
respect to certain events, such as the child’s birthday or a major holiday, so
that the defendant has a reasonable idea as to the time frame in which the
illegal conduct allegedly occurred.”142 In adding detail to verdict directors,
however, prosecutors must avoid impermissibly commenting on the evidence
adduced at trial. In State v. Eaker, a Washington court of appeals concluded a
verdict director detailing the time of the offense as “while [the victim’s]
parents were on vacation on the day that [defendant] was babysitting [the
victim] and took him to his house” improperly assumed as undisputed the facts
it alleged.143
Practically speaking, Celis-Garcia makes clear that for prosecutors, the
new face of child sex crimes is the “elect or instruct” rule. At first glance,
instruction seems preferable to election because it affords the jury a great deal
of latitude in finding the defendant guilty. Jurors need not specify the particular
occurrence upon which their guilty verdict is based, and need only agree
unanimously on a particular act for each count after considering all of the
evidence introduced by the prosecution. While Celis-Garcia essentially
overruled the reasoning of the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. Germany,
which focused on an overarching belief in the defendant’s guilt, 144 that same
rationale generally underlies prosecutorial preference for instruction over
election. As the South Dakota Supreme Court correctly observed, credibility is
usually the “true issue” in child sex crimes, and the jury will either “believe the
child’s testimony that the consistent, repetitive pattern of acts occurred or
disbelieve it.”145 In those cases, “the only question is whether the defendant in

141. 28 Mo. Cr. Prac. Handbook § 7:3 (2012); see also State v. Mills, 872 S.W.2d 875, 878
(Mo. App. Ct. 1994) (“Under Rule 23.04 a trial court has discretion to direct or permit the filing
of a bill of particulars. Denial of a motion for a bill of particulars will not be disturbed unless an
abuse of discretion is shown. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling for abuse in this regard we know
that ‘[t]he function of such a bill is limited to that of informing the defendant of the particulars of
the offense sufficiently to prepare his defense.’” (citations omitted)).
142. 28 Mo. Cr. Prac. Handbook § 7:3 (2012). The practice guide additionally notes that the
State often responds to a motion for a bill of particulars by arguing that discover will provide the
answers required by the defendant, but this argument is improper “since the burden is not on the
defendant to provide information sufficient to prepare a defense.” Id.
143. 53 P.3d 37, 41–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
144. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
145. State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 520 (S.D. 2009).
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fact committed all of [the acts.]”146 Although jurors in multiple acts cases often
believe or disbelieve the entirety of a child’s allegations, this will not always
be the case.
In many circumstances, it will be more favorable for the prosecution to
rely solely on one underlying act for each count charged in order to ensure a
guilty verdict. In issuing a unanimity instruction in cases involving young
children who may be confused as to particular dates and occurrences, the
prosecution risks that the jury will fail to reach unanimous agreement as to a
particular count. By electing a single act for which the prosecution is able to
produce the most convincing evidence, the prosecution is more likely to
receive a favorable verdict.
D. A Breakdown of Prosecutorial Either/or Strategy
As previously established, the danger of multiplicity arises in a multiple
acts case when the number of acts alleged exceeds the number of counts
charged.147 If the number of acts alleged in trial matches the number of counts
charged against the defendant in the indictment, the only potential threat to a
defendant’s unanimity rights arises from the danger of duplicity. Duplicity is
created only when the defendant is charged with an offense capable of
commission by alternative means, such as statutory sodomy, and only when
those means are presented within the indictment in the disjunctive.148 So long
as prosecutors are careful not to enable the jury to convict the defendant if they
believe any of several acts constituting the offense occurred, prosecutorial
either/or strategy will only come into play when the number of acts alleged at
trial exceeds the number of counts charged in the indictment. Prosecutorial
either/or strategy can arguably be broken down into three main steps, each of
which is associated with a distinct trial phase.
Step One—Indictment Phase: The first step in prosecutorial either/or
strategy begins in the indictment phase. If a defendant is alleged to have
committed multiple offenses, the prosecution must carefully consider the
number of counts with which the defendant will be charged for each offense.
In criminal cases where the defendant is accused of child molestation or sexual
assault, the Federal Rules of Evidence permit a trial court to admit evidence
that the defendant committed any other child molestation or sexual assault.149
In contrast, evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of sexual misconduct is
inadmissible under Missouri law as improper character evidence.150 Even when

146. Id. at 519.
147. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
149. Fed. R. Evid. 413–14.
150. In State v. Ellison, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down Missouri Statute 566.025,
which made evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct admissible in sex cases, as
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the prosecution intends to ultimately elect a single occurrence or transaction to
constitute a charged offense, prosecutors should initially charge every possible
count of sexual misconduct in order to introduce a full range of evidence
against the defendant at trial. Failure to charge all relevant acts could result in
the inadmissibility of the defendant’s prior alleged acts involving the victim in
some courts.
Step Two—Amendment Phase: Although many prosecutors are
undoubtedly tempted to submit the maximum possible counts against a
defendant to the jury for deliberation, judges rarely stack sentences
consecutively. More often than not, a defendant’s sentence for each count runs
concurrently with the additional sentences,151 mitigating the benefit of
charging multiple counts in a criminal indictment. Because jurors in multiple
acts cases must now be completely unanimous as to which of the alleged acts
they will rely upon in convicting the defendant for each count,152 prosecutors
should consider amending the indictment to a single count for each offense
charged based on the overall presentation of evidence at trial. In doing so, the
prosecution arguably removes a great deal of potential confusion,
disagreement, or even deadlock from jury deliberation.153
Step Three—Instruction Phase: Finally, after amending the criminal
indictment (and regardless of the number of counts charged for each offense), a
special instruction explaining the prosecution’s election of a single act or
submission of a special unanimity instruction should be submitted to the jury.
If the prosecution chooses to issue a special unanimity instruction, the jury
may permissibly consider all of the acts introduced at trial in determining
which it will rely upon in rendering a guilty verdict. When a special unanimity

violating Article I, sections 17 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution. State v. Ellison, 239
S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. 2007) (en banc); see also State v. Davis, 226 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007) (“As a general rule, evidence of uncharged misconduct is inadmissible for the
purpose of showing the propensity to commit such crimes.”) (quoting State v. Barriner, 34
S.W.3d 139, 144 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (holding evidence of prior misconduct may be admissible
if it is logically relevant in establishing the defendant’s guilt)).
151. 21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 840 (2007).
152. See State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 158 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). It is no longer
permissible for each individual juror to determine which incident he or she will rely upon in
convicting the defendant.
153. One can easily imagine the inevitable jury deadlock that would ensue if multiple offenses
were charged in multiple counts, and each count required that the jury be unanimous as to a
particular act selected from multiple acts alleged. While there will certainly be situations where
the prosecution charges and receives guilty verdicts on multiple counts, the added counts simply
magnify the level of complexity faced by jurors in deliberating, more specifically when numerous
offenses are alleged. Ultimately, the prosecution must balance its desire to seek guilty verdicts on
multiple counts against the capacity of the jury to undertake deepening levels of analysis for
multiple and distinct offenses.
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instruction is issued to the jury in conjunction with the verdict directors, that
instruction should read:
The defendant is accused in Count _____ of having committed the crime of
_____. The State alleges that the defendant committed the crime of _____ on
multiple occasions.
In order to find the defendant guilty of _____ in Count _____, one particular
act of _____ must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and you must
unanimously agree to the same particular act constituting the offense.
You need not unanimously agree that the defendant committed all the acts of
_____, and it is not necessary that the particular act agreed upon be stated in
154
the verdict.

In cases where the prosecution believes there is “no reasonable likelihood of
juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not
the defendant in fact committed all of them,”155 prosecutors should consider
submitting an additional, modified unanimity instruction to the jury. This
instruction should read:
The defendant is accused in Counts _____ through _____ of having committed
the crime(s) of _____on multiple occasions.
If you unanimously agree that all of the acts alleged to have been committed
by the defendant in Counts _____ through _____ have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of _____ in Counts
_____ through _____.

If instead the prosecution chooses to elect a single act or occurrence to
constitute the offense charged, the jury will focus their attention specifically on
the act for which the prosecution is able to produce the strongest evidence.
When the prosecution charges one count of a criminal offense and elects a
single act to constitute that offense, the instruction submitted in conjunction
with the verdict director should read:
In alleging the defendant committed the crime of _____, the State relies upon
evidence regarding a single act constituting the alleged crime.
To convict the defendant of ____, you must unanimously agree that this
156
specific act was proved.

154. This suggested instruction is patterned after WPIC 4.25 (3d ed. 2008) and PIK-CR3d
68.07 (2009).
155. See supra notes 127 and accompanying text. The South Dakota Supreme Court also
stated this instruction should always be given where “the testimony of the victim recounts
undifferentiated or generic occurrences of the sexual act,” because “neither an election nor a
unanimity instruction is very helpful where the victim is unable to distinguish between a series of
acts, any one of which could constitute the charged offense.” State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508,
519 (S.D. 2009).
156. This suggested instruction is patterned after WPIC 4.26 (3d ed. 2006).
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When an offense is charged in multiple counts, the instruction prefacing the
verdict directors should read:
In alleging the defendant committed the crime of _____ in Count _____, the
State relies upon evidence regarding a single act constituting the alleged crime.
To convict the defendant on Count _____, you must unanimously agree that
157
this specific act was proved.

This instruction must be reproduced for each count. Such instructions
specifying and explaining the state’s election of a particular occurrence cures
the constitutional defect found by the court in Celis-Garcia, and the state may
permissibly allege general time frames within the verdict directors for each
count.158 As established in early Missouri jurisprudence, such general time
frames are permissible because time is not of the essence in child sex crimes,
and the defendant is not unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy.159
Courts have long held time is not of the essence in child sex abuse cases,160
finding a “variance between allegation and proof is not fatal unless the
variance [is] material to the merits of the case and prejudicial to the defense of
the defendant.”161 When the defendant is unable to raise or establish an alibi
defense in trial, general allegations of time are properly upheld by the trial
court.162 In these circumstances, the defendant is “adequately protected” by the
requirement that the trier of fact, who “weigh[s] the witness’s inability to
specify the exact day and time of the alleged crime,” as well as “the subsequent
inability of the defendant to establish an alibi defense over so long a period of
time,” must find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.163 Courts have held
general time frames do not subject the defendant to double jeopardy because:

157. This suggested instruction is patterned after WPIC 4.26 (3d ed. 2006).
158. General timeframes may also be alleged in conjunction with a unanimity instruction for
the same reasons.
159. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 929 S.W.2d 909, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
160. See State v. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). The
court stated the following:
The state in the case at bar could not have been any more specific as to the date and time
of occurrence. The child victim was unable to narrow the time span to a period shorter
than while she was in the second and third grade. We find the more prudent rule of law to
be reflected in those cases which expressly recognize that an alibi defense does not
change the nature of the charges against the defendant or suddenly incorporate time as a
necessary element of the offense. Any other rule would too often preclude prosecution of
crimes involving child victims as here where the crimes are not discovered until some
time after commission.
Id.
161. State v. Douglas, 720 S.W.2d 390, 393–94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting State v. Jarrett,
481 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo 1972)).
162. See id.
163. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d at 541–42.
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“[w]hen time is not of the essence of an offense and the state is not confined in
its proof to any specific date within the statute of limitations, a prosecution
therefor[sic] will usually operate as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for this
offense committed within the period of limitation at any time prior to the filing
164
of the information or indictment.”

For the first time since Celis-Garcia, a Missouri appellate court validated this
reasoning in State v. Miller.165 Interestingly, the defendant in Miller was
charged with ten counts of sexual abuse over an eight-year period166 but
convicted of only six counts.167 Citing to Celis-Garcia, the court observed it is
“well settled law” that “time is not ‘of the essence’” in sex offenses, and “the
inclusion of a more restrictive time range in an instruction constitutes mere
surplusage.”168 The court further observed that “[u]nlike the time of the
offense, which . . . is not an essential element thereof, the method of the
charged offense, as prescribed by statute, is an essential element of the
crime.”169 The jury’s decision to find the defendant not guilty of four counts
charged in the ten-count indictment lends further support to the idea that jurors
are capable of differentiating between the various offenses alleged in a multicount indictment, particularly when each offense is represented by one
count.170
CONCLUSION
In recognizing the changes effected by Celis-Garcia, it is equally
important to recognize what has not changed. In Missouri, a high emphasis
will continue to be placed on protecting child victims.171 The prosecution’s
ability to submit general verdict directors in a multiple acts case has been
affected only in that additional steps must be taken by the prosecution prior to
deliberation in order to protect the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury
verdict. While Celis-Garcia undoubtedly makes it more difficult for
prosecutors to obtain guilty verdicts in multiple acts cases by adding an
additional unanimity requirement, it also affords defendants necessary and
critical constitutional protection in multiple acts cases.
In any multiple acts case, prosecutors will first need to determine the
nature of the offenses charged in the indictment. For each offense capable of
164. Douglas, 720 S.W.2d at 395 (quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 280 (1978)).
165. State v. Miller, No. WD 71175, 2011 WL 2446408, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. June 21, 2011).
166. More specifically, the defendant was charged with one count for each offense.
167. Miller, 2011 WL 2446408 at *1.
168. Id. at *2.
169. Id. at *4. The court concluded that “[a]ccordingly, even if there is sufficient evidence to
convict a defendant of the charged crime on an alternative basis for the offense permitted by
statute, where that method was not submitted to the jury, the conviction cannot stand.” Id.
170. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 42–44.
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commission by alternative means, the prosecution must then determine which
means of commission are relevant to the case.172 For each of these alternative
means, at least one count should be charged within the general time frame
established by the victim so as not to limit the admissibility of evidence at trial.
The prosecutor should be as specific as possible in alleging this time frame so
as to enable the defendant to adequately prepare his or her defense. As noted in
Celis-Garcia, this will be particularly important when the defendant’s trial
strategy is to rely upon the “evidentiary inconsistencies and factual
improbabilities respecting each specific allegation.”173 At the close of the
evidence, prosecutors must strategically determine whether to proceed on all
counts or to amend the indictment so that each offense is represented by one
count. Finally, after determining the number of counts upon which it will rely,
the prosecution must decide whether to elect one underlying act to constitute
the charged offense for each count or to submit a special unanimity instruction
to the jury for deliberation.174 In cases where the defendant’s guilt is
overwhelming and the entirety of the child’s testimony is likely to be received
by the jury as credible—or alternatively where the child has difficulty
articulating and distinguishing between the various offenses—the jury should
arguably receive a special unanimity instruction. When the defendant is likely
to rely on evidentiary inconsistencies and factual improbabilities, as is often
the case in child sex crimes, a specific election by the prosecution will
arguably be more beneficial.
Celis-Garcia is a hallmark decision in Missouri constitutional law because
of the protection it affords defendants in all multiple acts cases, irrespective of
subject matter. By requiring the most stringent possible standard of specificity
in verdict directors, a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict is properly
safeguarded from duplicitous and multiplicitous indictments. When
approached strategically by prosecutors, the either/or rule will not burden
criminal convictions, but rather strengthen the overall criminal justice system.
BLISS WORRELL*
172. See infra Addendum.
173. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 159 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (“[T]he fact that Ms.
Celis-Garcia relied on evidentiary inconsistencies and factual improbabilities respecting each
specific allegation of hand-to-genital contact makes it more likely that individual jurors convicted
her on the basis of different acts.” (emphasis added)).
174. Still, if the single count charged represents an offense capable of commission by
alternative means, the prosecution must ensure such means are not submitted in the disjunctive
within the verdict director. Arguably, this is a “forced” election in that the prosecution must
specify to the jury upon which means it will rely for a conviction.
* J.D. candidate, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Anders Walker for his direction and input
in overseeing the development of this paper, and also Judge Michael Wolf for his invaluable input
based on his experience on the bench. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the Saint Louis
University Law Journal for their diligent work spent readying this paper for publication.
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ADDENDUM: PROSECUTORIAL EITHER/OR CHECKLIST
Table 1: Offenses Involving “Deviate Sexual Intercourse”175
Offenses

Means of Commission

FORCIBLE & STATUTORY SODOMY
§ 566.060
§ 566.062
§ 566.064

CONTACT BETWEEN VICTIMS
GENITALS AND. . .
 Defendant’s Hand
 Defendant’s Mouth
 Defendant’s Tongue
 Defendant’s Anus

DEVIATE SEXUAL ASSAULT
§ 566.070

CONTACT BETWEEN DEFENDANTS
GENITALS AND. . .
 Victim’s Hand
 Victim’s Mouth
 Victim’s Tongue
 Victim’s Anus
PENETRATION OF VICTIM’S SEX
ORGAN BY. . .
 Defendant’s Finger
 Instrument or Object
PENETRATION OF VICTIM’S ANUS
BY . . .
 Defendant’s Finger
 Instrument or Object

175. Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.010(1) (2006). As evidenced by Table 1, any offense involving
“deviate sexual intercourse” could potentially be committed by any one of twelve alternative
means for each count charged. If multi-count indictments submitted to juries failed to allege the
specific act constituting the offense for each count charged, one can easily imagine scenarios in
which jurors would be able to individually select from as many as 50+ alleged occurrences in
unanimously finding the defendant guilty.
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Table 2: Offenses Involving “Sexual Contact”176
Offenses

Means of Commission

CHILD MOLESTATION
§ 566.067
§ 566.068

DEFENDANT TOUCHES VICTIM’S. . .
 Genitals
 Anus
 Female Breasts
 Any of Above through Clothing

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
§ 566.090
§ 566.093
§ 566.095

DEFENDANT TOUCHES VICTIM
WITH HIS/HER GENITALS

SEXUAL ABUSE
§ 566.100

176. Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.010(3) (2006). As evidenced by Table 2, any offense involving
“sexual contact” could potentially be committed by any one of five alternative means for each
count charged.
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